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NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND DEFENSE REFORM IN UKRAINE

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ABSTRACT

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The Orange Revolution, during which Ukrainians made a choice for freedom and democracy, gave a cogent answer to a fundamental question: is the Ukrainian nation able to build a modern, independent, and democratic state? Ukraine has created new opportunities for solving current problems, crafting an active foreign and domestic policy based on universal democratic values. As an important component of national development, military reforms have being initiated and aimed at the transformation of all levels of Ukraine's military organization, which includes the Armed Forces and other military formations. The main goal of this research project is to analyze the most important issues associated with the emerging Ukrainian National Security Strategy, identify possible threats and challenges for national security, and on that basis estimate the priorities for military strategy and defense reform in Ukraine. The project develops a critical view of the current domestic and international environment within which the transformation of Ukraine's Defense Sector is occurring. It attempts to specify priorities for the further development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces that will provide the capabilities needed in today's security environment, protect Ukrainian national interests, and enable Ukraine to participate in the whole spectrum of possible coalition operations.

NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND DEFENSE REFORM IN UKRAINE

Ukraine has a long and glorious history, rich and unique cultural background, distinctive language, and strong, freedom-loving spirit. But for many years Ukrainians have not been master on their own land. Many generations of Ukrainians fought for freedom and independence with the dream of establishing Ukraine as a sovereign state. This dream became a great national idea which consolidated the nation and helped it to survive during periods of repression, genocide, and attempts at national dissolution. The Ukrainian nation successfully passed through these periods of historical disorientation, and eventually achieved its long-awaited independence and began to construct independent state institutions on its native land.

Given its difficult and ambiguous historical background, from the first years of independence Ukraine has confronted the need to address a fundamental question: is the Ukrainian nation able to build a modern, independent, democratic state? Fifteen years of state building (which were not always as successful as desired, but were at least peaceful and without bloody conflicts, in comparison with other post-Soviet countries), the brilliant victory achieved during the Orange revolution which confirmed the adherence of Ukrainians to freedom and democracy, and the strong will to resist attempts at federalization and division of the country, demonstrated during the most recent parliamentary elections, have provided an incontestable response to that historical question.

The President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko has asserted that the most important achievements of independent Ukraine since 1991 are the proclamation of independence; formation of full-fledged state institutions; embarking upon a course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration; dramatic upsurge of civil consciousness; and democratic victory of Ukrainian society in 2004. These achievements form the foundation of today's Ukraine and serve as proof that Ukraine has become a fully established sovereign state.[1] The Ukrainian people have definitively chosen to align themselves with liberal and democratic values, including freedom and equity.

In order to promote these values Ukraine needs must to establish an effective national security policy aimed at protecting national interests and guaranteeing security on the individual, societal, and state levels from external and internal threats in all spheres of vital activity. The core element of this national security policy is the reform and development of Ukraine's military organization, which includes the Ukrainian Armed Forces, other military formations, and the law-enforcement bodies. The transformation of Ukraine's defense sector is based on the principle of defensive sufficiency.

General National Security Issues

The stable development of any state is impossible without a clear vision of its role in the contemporary world and an integral strategy for the future. In many countries this integral strategy is provided by the National Security Strategy, which describes the prospects for the development of foreign and domestic policy, identifies the country's national interests, and outlines strategies for their pursuit. The National Security Strategy as a program should offer an agenda for action directed toward building and reinforcing a desired model for the nation's future.

Ukrainian National Security Strategy, or "Grand Strategy" as it is sometimes called, can be broadly defined as the art and science of formulating, integrating, and executing political, economic, diplomatic, military, informational, and other instruments of national power with the purpose of achieving National Security Goals during times of peace and war. Ukrainian National Security Strategy is a planned, systematic, and rational process in which tasks of internal and foreign policies are determined in accordance with national interests, values, and priorities. The strategy for achieving these tasks is based on the analysis of available resources and the global environment.

Formulating the Ukrainian National Security Strategy, from the first years of independence, became a most significant and important task. It has been a responsibility that Ukraine has confronted in the same way as many other emerging states. Underestimation of the importance of an effective national security and military policy dearly cost the young, independent Ukrainian state that briefly emerged following the Russian Revolution in 1917. The first President of Ukraine in this period, Myhailo Hrushevsky, was a great philosopher and a prominent historian who restored the historical truth about the origins and national identity of the Ukrainian people in his famous multi-volume study *The History of Ukraine-Russ*.[2] But he did not understand the importance of effective military policy and the role of the Army in the state building process. That is one of the reasons why Ukrainian statehood was not adequately defended at the time. In conjunction with other internal and external factors Ukraine lost its sovereignty and fell under communist rule for more than 70 years.

In accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian Law the main subjects of Ukrainian national security policy are (i) the *individual and citizen*, with responsibility to defend their constitutional rights and freedoms; (ii) the *society*, including its spiritual, moral, ethical, cultural, historical, intellectual and material values, the informational media and environment as well as natural resources; and (iii) the *state*, including its constitutional order, sovereignty,

territorial integrity and inviolability. The most important Ukrainian national interests are: guaranteeing the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen; developing civil society and democratic institutions; protecting state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of the state borders, securing non-interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine; and strengthening political and social stability.[3]

The way that Ukraine defines its place on the grand geopolitical chessboard and the role that the country plays in implementing its National Security Strategy have great importance not only for Ukraine itself, but also for the European security system. In a joint statement U.S. President George W. Bush and Ukrainian President Yushchenko emphasized that the "territorial integrity, security, and political and economic transformation of Ukraine are essential to building a Europe whole, free and at peace…"[4]

Ukrainian National Security Strategy and the associated National Military Strategy are closely connected, interrelated, and interdependent. They are based on the Constitution of Ukraine. These two components of the most important state activity are the key factors for formulating, integrating, and executing both domestic and international policies. They are directed toward building a modern and developed democratic state, based on the highest European standards, capable of integrating with the European and Euro-Atlantic collective defense and security systems.

The Ukrainian National Security Strategy should address all real and potential threats to the country's national Interests. The Ukrainian law "On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" lists types of threats to the national interests and national security of Ukraine and outlines basic directions for state policy aimed at the minimization of all negative factors in the spheres of internal and external policy, homeland security, economy, science and technology, the social and humanitarian areas, ecology, and information.[5] Thus, Ukrainian National Security Strategy has been projected into the global and domestic environments.

<u>Domestic Prospects of National Security Strategy</u>

For a long period of time beginning with the mid-14th century, the western and eastern parts of modern Ukraine were separated and integrated into diverse and competing neighboring states, including the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Muscovite Principality, Poland, and Russian Empire.[6] Some of these states, and the Russian Empire in particular, pursued the brutal policy of dissolving the Ukrainians as a nation. But national history is something that cannot be stolen. For example, Ukraine's rich historical heritage, which has roots from the 9th century Riurik dynasty of Kievan Russ, was misappropriated by the Moscow Principality,

claimed as its own, and integrated into the Great Russian Empire.[7] The attempts to destroy Ukrainian national identity were continued during Soviet time under the doctrine of assimilating all peoples living in USSR into one "Soviet people," which was "an ideological demonym and proposed ethnonym for the population of the Soviet Union."[8]

These historical circumstances have created some ethnic, confessional, socio-economic, geo-cultural, and other differences between the populaces of different Ukrainian regions. In comparison to other countries which have also suffered from internal divisions inherited from their history, Ukraine has been something of a unique case. In Ukraine, internal differences have come together and been localized. They have the potential to grow into serious contradictions. Moreover, during the first years of independence Ukraine lacked a developed civil society and "national idea" – a clear national strategy for the country's development that could consolidate the nation.[9] The previous ideal of establishing a sovereign state, which helped Ukrainians to survive during centuries of national denial, was successfully accomplished in 1991.

Internal division has provoked what is probably the main threat for Ukrainian national security - the split in national mentality including political, economic, social, religious, ethnic and geographic parameters. The outcome of the recent Ukrainian parliamentary election which took place on March 26, 2006 demonstrated the dangerous division of Ukraine into pro-Eastern and pro-Western parts.

> From one pro-Eastern side, the *Party of Regions* (*Partiya Rehioniv*) led the Ukrainian parliamentary elections with 32.14% of the vote. From another pro-Western side, the *Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko (Blok Yuliy Tymoshenko),* followed with a strong showing of 22.29%, The *Bloc Our Ukraine* (*Blok Nasha Ukrayina*) trailed with 13.95%, and the *Socialist Party of Ukraine* (*Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrayiny*) was fourth with 5.69% of the vote. The *Communist Party of Ukraine* (*Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny*) got only 3.66% (In the previous election the Communists had more then 20%).[10]

This threat can be overcome by the combined efforts of the Ukrainian parliament and government, and the Ukrainian elite. Forming the modern Ukrainian national idea, in the context of this threat, is the most important issue of national security in domestic perspective. In the current situation, when the Ukrainian national idea is still taking shape, and the national mentality, as mentioned, is split along many fault lines, only the self-coordinated complex of national interests, priorities, and goals is able to consolidate society around values that are shared by all, such as freedom, democracy, equality, fairness, and well-being. These values are understandable and acceptable for all Ukrainian people.

The National Unity Pact, signed on August 3, 2006, has become a political step toward the unification of right-bank and left-bank Ukraine (with the Dnipro river as dividing line), but more progress in achieving understanding within the society is needed.[11] This Pact ended the Ukrainian parliamentary crisis in 2006 and determined the strategic goals for Ukraine's further development on the basis of consolidating the European and Euro-Atlantic choices of the Ukrainian nation.

The other main issue of Ukrainian national security strategy that is directly connected to the domestic environment is the absence of a major document defining the National Security Strategy in definitive terms. Because Ukraine is a young state, with national institutions and democratic civil society still under construction, the crafting of a Ukrainian National Security Strategy as a long-term framework for development did not proceed as efficiently as hoped. The national research and development institutions which play the main role in the creation of the Ukrainian National Security Strategy are still being put together. Affected by euphoria and the inexperience of the first years of independence, the process was also set back by some mistakes and difficulties which have occurred in attempting to reform the government command and control system, affect changes in the Ukrainian economy, and develop a democratic culture in state institutions.

It should also be mentioned that a real threat to national security emerged from the ineffectiveness of the Ukrainian governmental system that was a legacy of "a Soviet administrative apparatus that was fashioned under a command economy and ultimately turned the country into little more than a colony of Moscow".[12] Ukraine scores poorly in most ratings provided by international financial institutions evaluating different aspects of the social and economic environment. For example, in economy competitiveness the Ukraine ranks 124th among 155 countries. In terms of investor protection, Ukraine is doing even worse, ranking 141st.[13]

At the same time Ukraine has great industrial potential: the country is capable of constructing missiles, all types of vessels, aircraft, and spacecraft. Ukraine is a leader in the steel industry on the European continent, has very important engineering sector, and 40% of the world's fertile agricultural land. More importantly, it has one of the most educated populations of Europe.[14] The percentage of highly educated adults is 99.6% (99.9% for young people). Moreover, "the index of the total number of students at institutions of higher education is 91, which is higher than in such developed countries as Italy, Germany, Switzerland (88), and the US (85)".[15] In fact, Ukraine invests well educated people, who can not find appropriate jobs in

their home country, into the economies of other Western countries. The priority must be shifted toward taking care about its own economic development.

This is why improving the political-administrative system is one of the main Ukrainian priorities. Ukrainian administrative reform was initiated by a decree of the President of Ukraine in 1997. This reform was directed toward solving the main problems that existed concerning the exercise of executive power, including the lack of a clear definition of competencies, the many possibilities for corruption, an inefficient system of personnel management, and others. But the impact of the reform was less than expected. In 2005, when the new Ukrainian government came to office, a commitment to administrative reform was revived, and was extended to the entire state administrative system, including all power branches. Moreover, the implementation of administrative reforms in Ukraine now foresees giving more authority to local administrations (regions).

The next large problem which threatens Ukrainian national security, and could even provoke a loss of sovereignty, is the national economy's increased dependency upon energy supply from Russia. The Ukrainian economy arose from a part of the massive Soviet economy and inherited its biggest problem – an enormous utilization of energy, and especially natural gas. Although Ukraine has worked to develop energy-saving technology, the problem still has not been solved. Currently, a substantial part of the energy consumed in Ukraine is produced with gas and oil supplied from Russia. As events during the winter of 2005 have demonstrated, this monopoly supplier can cause significant problems for the Ukrainian economy, and even aspire to assert control or influence over Ukrainian foreign policy.

In order to overcome the threat a special state program has been established to develop a strategy and plan of action aimed at reducing Ukraine's dependence on imports of strategic resources.[16] The development of the Ukrainian energy system is based on indigenous national sources of energy (gas, oil and coal), increased production of nuclear power, decreased power-consumption by industry, and a search for new, alternative sources of energy. It will assure Ukraine's economic and political independence.

An analysis of all the above threats shows that Ukraine's national security is more threatened by trends in the domestic environment than developments in the international environment. The successful pursuit of Ukraine's goals in the international arena, including European and Euro-Atlantic integration, directly depends upon the success of Ukrainian domestic policy, which is based on democratization and national consolidation.

> Before Ukraine can build Europe at home, it will have to do away with the distortions of the Soviet period and the legacy of authoritarian governance in the

post-Soviet era, complete the process of defining its national identity, and articulate its national interests.[17]

A major source of contemporary conflict is the failure of developing nations to pursue effective national domestic policies. The main causes of this failure is weak governance leading to social and economic instability, the lack of a legislative base for effective leadership, the absence of a developed system of civil control over the military sphere, the presence in higher command positions of persons opposed to democratic changes, the degradation of armaments and demoralization of personal in the armed forces, the activation of antigovernment political organizations, and eventually a crisis of the homeland security system. Although Ukraine has successfully avoided most of these destabilizing factors, they can still impact upon its security.

The modern word is also destabilized by dangerous ambiguities in international law which can encourage radical separate movements and provoke armed conflicts. There is an unresolved friction between the right of nations to self-determination on the one hand, and the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity on the other. This contradiction has caused or encouraged many conflicts within the post-Soviet space and in the entire contemporary world.

The most recent Ukrainian presidential and parliament elections showed that some of the preconditions for extremist and separatist movements are still alive in the different Ukrainian regions, and that such movements could be supported by radical political forces within neighboring countries. Developments like this would destabilize the political situation in those regions and seriously threaten Ukrainian national security.

In order to prepare to confront these destabilizing factors and avoid possibilities of state failure, Ukraine needs "internal concentration that would enable the country's consolidation and finally put its own basic interests at the core of its activities."[18] Ukraine's national security strategy should be nationalized based on fundamental democratic principles and become immune from domestic political infighting and foreign influence.[19]

International Prospects of National Security Strategy

The international prospects of Ukrainian National Security Strategy are shaped by internal factors and can be broadly defined as a "system of goals that a state sets for itself in the international system and means which it uses to achieve them."[20]

The contemporary world has several distinctive features. First of all, most states strive to enhance strategic stability through joint, concerted efforts. Second, they establish transparency in the military and political spheres by implementing verification regimes. Third, further aggravation of global problems stipulates the combination of national interests in many states

7

and transforms interstate relations into partnership and alliances. This significantly increases the number of international political, economic, and military structures at the interstate, regional, and global levels. These distinguishing characteristics of the modern world have a significant impact on Ukrainian National Security Strategy.

While taking the first steps after its independence, Ukraine experienced some uncertainties in determining its political course, and was not able to properly identify and estimate the real threats and challenges for Ukrainian National Security. The first Ukrainian national security documents, such as *The Foundations of Ukraine's Foreign Policy* (1993)[21] and the *Concept of the National Security of Ukraine* (1997)[22] did not provide clear guidelines for national strategic priorities. Ukraine's posture in the "geopolitical triangle" between the European Union, the United States, and Russia was not conducive to advancing its national interests. "Despite numerous declarations and high-pitched statements, Ukraine's leadership failed to secure dynamic, equal and mutually advantageous cooperation with Brussels, Moscow and Washington."[23] Ukrainian foreign policy during this period was weak and unclear, and attempted to pursue pro-Western (toward the EU and NATO) and pro-Eastern (toward Russia) orientations simultaneously. Clear national priorities had not been determined, and the state continued to maintain an ambiguous nonaligned status. Obviously, national security strategy was not as effective as was required, and at the end of 2004 Ukraine came to the realization that it was in a foreign policy crisis.

At the same time, from the beginning of its state-building process Ukraine accomplished many significant achievements in the sphere of national security. These achievements form the basis for a future Ukrainian National Security Strategy. The most important of them can be described as follows: (i) accepting non-nuclear status while achieving strong guarantees for the sovereignty and territorial indivisibility of Ukraine; (ii) sustaining a strategic course toward European integration; and (iii) building strategic partnerships with the United States and Russia, as well as good relations with other countries. Ukraine avoided the danger of losing its economic and political independence, and became one of the first post-Soviet countries to join the NATO-initiated "Partnership for Peace" program.

Large changes in the European security environment over the last decade, such as the enlargement of NATO and strengthening of the European Union, have inspired significant changes in Ukrainian national security strategy. The new period of Ukrainian "constructive partnership" began in 2005. It diverges significantly from past approaches by "reducing the importance of geopolitical calculations, transforming Ukraine into a self-sufficient actor in international relations and revealing its true European nature."[24] As was observed by President

Yushchenko, "in today's complex international security environment, Ukraine needs a clear and credible security and defense policy to play its part in the world community as a mature democratic state."[25]

In other words, from the year 2005 Ukraine began to realize its significant geopolitical potential. The father of modern geopolitical theory Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book *The Grand Chessboard,* predicted that "somewhere between 2005 and 2010, Ukraine, especially if in the meantime the country has made significant progress in its domestic reforms and has succeeded in becoming more evidently identified as a Central European country, should become ready for serious negotiations with both the European Union and NATO."[26] Brzezinski placed Ukraine in the "Critical Core" of European security, which also included France, Germany, and Poland and accounted for almost 230 million people involved in political cooperation. From this perspective the future of Ukraine is of vital importance for Europe.

Speculating about the historical place of Ukraine on the world's "Grand Chessboard," Brzezinski assumes that the country belongs to Europe and has ethnic and cultural roots there. Its separation from the European mainstream by the Iron Curtain was therefore basically artificial. The fact that the geographical centre of Europe is located on Ukrainian territory adds force to this statement. Ukraine's commitment to restoring its historical relations with the European democratic community is absolutely natural.

The success of Ukraine's democratic transformation can have a beneficial effect upon the entire region, promoting the universal values of democracy, equality, fairness, and well-being. It can significantly influence the future of its neighbors, and particularly inspire great changes in Russia, which has still not determined the course of its further development, and in Belarus, which suffers from a lack of democracy and is slowly losing its economic and political independence. Eventually it can contribute to changing East-West relations as a whole, forming the basis for a new trans-Eurasian system of security. Taking into consideration the old historical contradiction between the eastern and western parts of Europe, "Ukraine's accession to the European Union will put an end to the division of Europe and provide a new impetus to our civilization."[27]

Ukraine cannot ensure its national security without unification with the European security system which is based on NATO and EU. But Ukraine's democratic choice is considered by Moscow as a hostile act that is detrimental to Russian national interests.

Both Ukraine and Russia, together with their neighbor Belarus, initiated the disbanding the Soviet Union and became the founders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This new political formation, taking the place of the former Soviet Union, initially pursued the aim of

establishing new principles of interstate relations which would be based on equality, respect for sovereignty, and mutually beneficial political, economic, and other cooperation. The CIS also had the important mission of preserving economic connections between the new independent states that had emerged from the former Soviet Union. In this way it was hoped that an economic collapse accompanied by declining living standards could be prevented. The CIS offered a great opportunity for all the former Soviet republics, as well as for Russia itself, to create democratic states with developed and socially-directed economies.

Unfortunately Russia has taken the position of imposing its domination over the region, seeking to recover its lost power through the full political, economic, and military integration of the former empire. In the light of Russian unwillingness to recognize Ukraine's borders, questioning of Ukraine's rights to Crimea, and insistence on exclusive extraterritorial control over the port of Sevastopol, Ukraine has recognized the real threat of "integration" with Russia within a special Slavic community (with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) or a so-called "Eurasian Union."[28] That is why, after several years of searching between two possible alternatives, integration into European society became Ukraine's most appropriate choice.

However, as mentioned by the President of Ukraine, "European integration is not an alternative to good-neighborly relations with Russia. Both in the East and West there are Ukrainian interests. We want to assert these interests at the level of our strategic partners – Europe and Russia."[29]

The first national security document which reflected Ukraine's new course was created in 2003. The Law of Ukraine "On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" defines the fundamentals of state policy aimed at protecting national interests and guaranteeing the safety of the individual, society and state from external and internal threats in all spheres of vital activity. This law specifies the final goal of Ukraine's policy - European and Euro-Atlantic integration.[30] In accordance with this Law the process of developing Ukraine's National Security Strategy was initiated.

Simultaneous with formulating its National Security Strategy, Ukraine started to develop its Military Strategy. These two major state documents are very closely connected. There is no doubt that elaborating and implementing the National Security Strategy, including providing for a realistic and well-considered military policy, is the most important task confronting Ukraine today. These new strategic documents derive from the Ukrainian national interests, take into account the geopolitical situation which is forming in Central Europe, are based on the real economic potential of Ukraine, respond to the imperative of defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and respect the national interests of Ukraine's neighboring states.

Military Strategy can be described as an official state policy which determines the main directions of military development and the employment of military power for achieving national strategic goals. Military strategy has theoretical and practical dimensions, including the development of conceptual documents in the military sphere and their implementation.

Military security can be considered as a criterion for estimating the effectiveness of military policy implementation. It develops courses of action for pursuing the national interests in the military sphere and assuring protection from internal threats and military aggression. However, ensuring an effective Ukrainian military strategy is impossible without increasing the level of the country's defensive capability.

There are the three basic concepts which could be applied for ensuring Ukraine's military security: (i) the concept of *cooperation* which includes participation in regional and global military and political organizations like the EU and NATO and considers using exclusively political, diplomatic, and economic means for preventing possible armed conflicts; (ii) the concept of *containment*, according to which Ukraine should build up its military capability and be able to reduce the possibility of war to the minimum without resort to armed forces; and (iii) the concept of *repulse* which foresees the ability, possibly in cooperation with allies, to rebuff an aggressor's attack.

Basil Liddell Hart offers a precise definition of Military Strategy as – "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."[31] The main element of military strategy is constructing the state's military system and defining how it will be used for achieving political objectives inside the country and in the international arena. With all this going on, the strategic goal of Ukraine's Military Strategy is to reduce the level of military peril for the country and to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts. Thus military strategy is aimed primarily at constructing the military system, determining its strength, and specifying the number and quality of armaments. The existence of relevant military power is one of the main factors assuring stability, security, and peace.

Uncertainty in Ukrainian national security policy has complicated its Military Strategy. The National Military Strategy is subordinated to the National Security Strategy, whose goals it supports, and from which it derives its main tasks and responsibilities. Without tasks and strategic goals that were clearly defined by the Ukrainian National Security Strategy, reform of the defense sector in Ukraine was reduced to the lowest common denominator of a simple downsizing of the Armed Forces' strength and armaments. As stated in the most recent Ukrainian defense policy document – White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine, "despite

tremendous efforts and some positive results, the efficiency of the military reform carried out in 2001-2005 was lower than had been planned."[32] This led toward military degradation and an inefficient allocation of national resources. It has produced many challenges, which continue to confront the Ukrainian Armed Forces today. For example, despite years of continuous downsizing, the Armed Forces still have huge stockpiles of outdated and dangerous munitions inherited from Soviet times.

Other challenges are the product of more than a decade of financial and political neglect by the political leadership of independent Ukraine. The same Armed Forces that serve as a guarantee of national independence and sovereignty found themselves lacking training and equipment to meet the most basic missions, lacking clear political guidance as to priorities for their development, and suffering from ever-lower morale that undermined the Armed Forces' most precious resource – its people. To address these challenges and to improve the situation in the Armed Forces radically, Ukraine needed to recast its national security strategy as a basis for making its military policy more clear, realistic, and effective.

A new Military Doctrine of Ukraine was approved in June 2004.[33] Ukraine's military policy has been changed and Ukrainian defense reform has been given a more systematic and aim-directed character. In order to make these changes possible, for first time in Ukrainian history in 2003-2004 a formal Defense Review was conducted and the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine for the period up to 2015 was created and approved by the President of Ukraine. This Bulletin is a long-term conceptual document, which outlines the reform of Ukraine's Armed Forces and other military formations until 2015.[34]

These reforms are vital—not least because Ukraine inherited Armed Forces whose functions and capabilities were developed during the Cold War and no longer met the requirements of a changed security environment. "The sustaining of about 900,000 of Armed Forces personnel was equal to the failure of the economy."[35] Also, severe under funding in relation to the overall size of the armed forces has led to a deterioration of the combat capabilities and combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The main goals and objectives of Ukraine's defense transformation were determined in order to create favorable conditions for the promotion of freedom, independence, and economic growth. This can only be achieved in a peaceful and stable environment. Therefore, Ukraine's security and defense policy has two dimensions: a national and an international. Nationally, our defense policy aims at maintaining national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, as well as prevention of military intervention into the internal affairs of Ukraine. The international aspect assumes that Ukraine's national security and economic prosperity is

inseparably linked to events in Europe and in the world as a whole, and may be affected by conflicts elsewhere. Therefore, Ukraine will continue to actively contribute to international and multinational efforts promoting peace and stability, not only in the region, but also in other parts of the world.

The new Ukrainian military strategy also confirmed that national security would best be underpinned by broadening and deepening partnership relations with international organizations and through integration with Euro-Atlantic and European security and defense structures.

A comprehensive risk and threats analysis led to the conclusion that the likelihood of large-scale aggression against Ukraine is low. Nonetheless, the possibility of crises or conflicts emerging from political or economic instability, religious confrontation, and ethnic tensions in the vicinity of Ukraine cannot entirely be ruled out.[36] Under certain circumstances they may spill over to Ukraine, and thus create a serious threat to national security. There are also other threats, which require close international coordination and concerted efforts to be addressed effectively. These threats include international terrorism, uncontrolled proliferation of weapon of mass destruction and dual use technologies, arms smuggling, illegal migration, and drugs trafficking.

The tasks and missions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces were defined based on the prospective defense objectives and risk and threat assessments. On this basis the capabilities and resources needed to perform these tasks and missions were determined.

These assessed requirements were compared with current capabilities and it was concluded that at present the Armed Forces do not meet Ukraine's defense needs. Therefore, the main goals of the military were re-elaborated. These goals will be achieved in the following ways: first is to decrease the Armed Forces' strength drastically, which will require social assistance to redundant personnel, and to carry out base closures and base conversion as well as disposal of surplus equipment and ammunition; second is to professionalize the Armed Forces and to improve training; and third is to achieve NATO standards, which will facilitate Ukraine's strategic course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Prospects for Defense Reform in Ukraine

In the 2005 the third period of defense reform in Ukraine was completed. This process was begun in June 2000 with the State program of Armed Forces reorganization and development until the 2005. Unfortunately, because for a long period of time Ukrainian military strategy was not clearly defined and did not provide carefully specified tasks and goals for Armed Forces, and due to the inadequate financial resources allocated to the defense sector,

"the projected qualitative modernization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has not been fully achieved."[37]

The core element of the Armed Forces reorganization is a new system of defense planning which is based on modern NATO standards. Since 2004, effective systems of defense planning command and control responsible for collecting, estimating, and analyzing information about current troop posture and capable of planning transformation at all levels of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Command and Control System have been established. The new system is based on the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Executing System. Due to the fact that this system was successfully established in the Ministry of Defense, the State Program of Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2006-2011 was created and the main prospects of defense reform in Ukraine for the next six years were defined. The unclassified explanation of this Program is presented in the annual publication "White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine".[38] In accordance with the State Program, Ukraine is seeking to create Armed Forces that will provide the capabilities needed in today's security environment, that will be able to defend and protect state territory, sovereignty and national interests, and that can participate together with other nations in the whole spectrum of possible coalition operations.

Taking into consideration national interests, the Ukrainian Armed Forces should be able, working together with other state institutions, to implement the following tasks: to defend Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders; to participate in peacekeeping, humanitarian, and multinational crisis response operations, including peace enforcement operations; to support law enforcement authorities in their efforts to respond effectively to non-military risks and threats such as international terrorism, illegal arms trafficking, proliferation of missile technologies, proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration, religious and ethnic extremism, social crisis inside the country, etc; and to provide assistance to the appropriate national and local authorities as well as provide support for relief in cases of natural and man-made disasters.

The organizational structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in compliance with the Law of Ukraine *"On the Armed Forces of Ukraine"*, is composed of: (i) the General Staff; (ii) three services (Land Forces, Air Forces, and Navy); (iii) other formations, military educational institutions, and organizations, which are not subordinate to individual service branches and are therefore under the direct command of the General Staff.[39]

In accordance with defined tasks and missions, the armed forces are divided into functional components. The Joint Rapid Reaction Forces is the most powerful part of the Armed Forces and should be capable of reacting immediately in crisis situations. The Main Defense

Forces should be ready to fulfill their tasks after mobilization and additional combat training. The core elements of the Armed Forces will include the multifunctional and mobile units organized on the basis of a modular principle with a capability to create brigade and battalion tactical groups. They will be able to operate in joint and multinational operations as well as carry out a wide range of tasks while operating independently.

The structure of the Armed Forces in both organizational and functional dimensions meets the requirements of the tasks and missions defined in accordance with the new military Doctrine of Ukraine.[40]

The Command and Control System of the Armed Forces will be also rationalized and there will be a clear division between the functions and tasks of the General Staff and those of the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is the main executive body for implementation of the State's policy in the political-military field. It focuses upon policy development, defense planning, budgetary, personnel and legal aspects, armaments policy, etc. The General Staff is subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and is the main body in charge of maintaining the operational readiness of the Armed Forces, operational planning, command and control, and coordination of operations and other joint activities with the various relevant authorities.

In light of the new tasks and missions determined for the Armed Forces, a new command and control management philosophy will be established which is focused on the control of the combined formations (force groupings) both in Ukraine and other regions of the world during combined operations conducted jointly with partner nation forces. The commands of services will be reorganized; their major responsibilities will be reduced to administrative control functions and will include developing, sustaining, training and equipping their troops. When required the services will become the contributors of troops (forces) for combined formations (force groupings) and peacekeeping contingents. The creation of the new command and control bodies was begun in 2006. Joint Operation Command will have the responsibility for operational planning, command and control of the combined formations (force groupings) and peacekeeping contingents. The functions of logistic system management within the Armed Forces will belong to the Joint Support Forces. New staff procedures, based upon those in NATO, will also be introduced as a part of our efforts to achieve interoperability with NATO command and control systems.[41]

In pursuance of the principle of "defensive sufficiency" it is planned to reduce significantly the manpower of the Armed Forces (from about 200,000 in 2007 to 143,000 by the end of 2011). This reduction will not lower the troops' combat readiness. It will be paralleled by

increasing combat readiness due to improved personnel structure including the move toward fully professional Armed Forces (by 2010 it is intended to fully revoke conscription in favor of manning the Armed Forces with contracted servicemen), and increased force training, which will enhance the capability to operate within multinational peacekeeping forces and interoperability with the staffs, units and elements of the NATO Armed Forces.[42]

The main priorities of Ukrainian defense reform also include: creating a new reserve system; modernizing and purchasing new armaments and ammunitions; developing control, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare systems; aircraft, antiaircraft protection, high-precision weapons; maintenance of capabilities concerning transportation of troops; and reforming maritime aviation and introducing new and upgraded ships and boats.

Many efforts in the Ukrainian defense sphere are planned to provide not only for the Armed Forces, but also for the deep reorganization of the entire Military Organization, which includes the Armed Forces, other military formations and law-enforcement bodies created in the framework of Ukrainian law. Ukraine's Military Organization is a unified military system with closely related parts for providing homeland security and defense. During peace time it is used for responding to emergency situations such as natural and man-made disasters under the supervision of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. During war time all military formations are placed under the authority of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The development and optimization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as well as the reorganization of other military formations will ensure Ukrainian national security, strengthen the Ukrainian Homeland Defense System and increase its effectiveness in protecting against internal and external threats.

Conclusions

After 15 years of independence Ukraine has achieved many positive results both in developing and shaping its domestic environment and in taking its first steps on the international arena. The most important are the formation of fully developed state institutions and Ukraine's democratic choice for further development. The European vector of Ukraine's foreign policy has formed the Ukrainian National Security Strategy and has significantly influenced Military Strategy and Defense Reform in Ukraine.

At the same time, Ukraine still faces threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity based on its difficult and ambiguous historical development, including the dangerous division of the country into pro-Eastern and pro-Western regions. These threats are aggravated by current difficulties in the Ukrainian economic transition, and much more by the extremist, mostly populist

policy pursued by some political parties, which threatens to destabilize the political situation. Another destabilizing factor for Ukraine's domestic environment is the economic and political pressure being exerted by Russia.

In light of these challenges and threats Ukraine is making great efforts to form a powerful Ukrainian National Idea, which can consolidate society around universal values such as freedom, democracy, equality, fairness, and well-being. In accordance with The National Unity Pact, signed in August 2006, creates a context for the unification of right- and left-bank Ukraine and the consolidation of a Ukrainian nation.

In its effort to implement its national goals, Ukraine is seeking the ways and means for increasing economic development, which can help to stabilize the internal situation, strengthen the position of Ukraine on the international arena, and reduce the possibility of economic and political pressure from any countries. Ukraine already has relevant industrial potential, high educational levels, and a higher level of economic growth. It needs to add effective governance. For that reason it has initiated profound political-administrative reform.

The most important dynamics of Ukrainian National Security are strategic partnership with United States and Russia, developed economic and political relations with other countries, and continuing partnership with NATO and the EU. Ukraine's geostrategic position between two poles—western and eastern—gives the country great political and economic benefits, but it also causes many difficulties. There are no simple solutions for Ukraine's further development. But there is no doubt that the development of Ukraine based on European political, economic, and social standards can produce great advantages for the entire region and even impact positively upon the political situation in the world as a whole.

At this time Ukraine is working to solve current economic and social problems, and to develop an active and transparent foreign and domestic policy. In accordance with possible threats and challenges for national security, Ukraine has determined its national goals and objectives, formulated the national military strategy and undertaken the necessary reform and transformation of all levels of its Military Organization. Ukraine is creating battle-worthy, professionally prepared Armed Forces, which will provide the capabilities needed in today's security environment, protect Ukraine's national interests both at home and abroad, work within the confines of available resources, and be able to participate together with other nations in the whole spectrum of possible coalition operations.

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